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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Arbitration: The Roles of the Arbitrators and the Ju-
diciary-Petitioner union, in the first of three companion cases to
be discussed, attempted to compel arbitration of a dispute over the re-
fusal of the company to reinstate an employee. The company would not
arbitrate on the grounds that the employee received a 25% permanent
partial disability judgment on a workmen's compensation claim and
thereby was not entitled to return to work by virtue of the seniority
provision of the agreement. This provision stated that the employer
would employ or promote employees on the principle of seniority "where
ability and efficiency are equal." The District Court held that the accept-
ance of the workmen's compensation settlement estopped the employee
from asserting seniority rights and did not allow arbitration. The Court
of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that the grievance was a frivolous
one and not arbitrable under the agreement. The Supreme Court, in
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), re-
versed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that:
The courts . .. have no business weighing the merits of the
grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular
claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the
written instrument which will support the claim. The agree-
ment is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those
the court will deem meritorious. The processing of even frivolous
claims may have therapeutic values which those who are not a
part of the plant environment may be quite unaware.' [Empha-
sis supplied.]
It is settled law that the question of arbitrability is for the courts,
not the arbitrators, to decide.2 When a court determines the arbitrability
of a dispute, the question of whether the claim is well founded or not
should be assumed immaterial.3 But New York and New Jersey main-
tain that a matter is arbitrable only if a "bona fide" dispute is presented.4
The dispute cannot be manifestly without foundation, or frivolous. The
leading case advocating the "bona fide" dispute prerequisite is Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hamniner.5 It was held there that an
agreement in the contract to discuss payment of a bonus by the company
was not arbitrable, since "if the meaning of the provision of the con-
tract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be any-
thing to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitra-
2 United Steelworkers v. Americn Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
2 Annot., 24 A.L.R. 2d 752, 766 (1952).
331 AM. JuL- LABOR §114 (1958).
4 Annot., 24 A.L.R. 2d 752, 762-63 (1952). At 756 n. 7, the author criticizes the
rule as being illogical. It would be logical if the court could set aside an award
for mistakes of law, but no such power exists in New York.
5271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 317 (1947) ; aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. 2d
464 (1947).
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tion."' The Court felt that the union was not seeking a discussion of
whether or not the company would pay the bonus, but a discussion of
what amount would be paid by the company. In the Court's opinion,
the union's position was "plainly" without merit and failed to raise a
"bona fide" dispute as to the meaning of a contract provision. In de-
ciding this case the lower court merely stated that a "bona fide" dispute
was necessary. No authority was cited, but in a dissenting opinion upon
appeal, Justice Fuld made reference to S. A. Wenger & Co. v. Propper
Silk Hosiery Mills.7 In the Wenger case it was said that:
Unquestionably a claim may be so unconscionable or a de-
fense so frivolous as to justify the court in refusing to order the
parties to proceed to arbitration; but where a bona fide dispute
in fact arises over the performance of a contract of purchase and
sale, it does not devolve upon the court to say that as a matter
of law there is nothing to arbitrate.8 [Emphasis supplied.]
Although the Wenger case dealt with commercial arbitration, it
seems to have been the authority for the Cutler-Hammer decision. A
question then arises as to whether such a rule of commercial arbitration
should have properly been transplanted into the field of labor arbitra-
tion. In many instances, commercial and labor arbitration may be gov-
erned by the same rules, but in some cases it is necessary to realize the
distinction between the two before a rule of commercial arbitration can
be carried over into labor arbitration. The rule for frivolous claims is
one such case. Commercial arbitration is used "to avoid the formalities,
the delay, the expense, and vexation of ordinary litigation." Usually
only a few persons are involved and rather strict interpretation of the
agreement is desired. Arbitration of frivolous claims is unlikely to
benefit the few. On the other hand labor arbitration is "primarily de-
signed to prevent strikes and other expressions of unrest by a prompt
and equitable settlement of labor disputes"'01 involving a large number
of persons. Arbitration of frivolous claims, then, may serve some pur-
pose in preventing industrial unrest." Therefore, it is doubtful whether
the Cutler-Hammer doctrine, originating in commercial arbitration,
should be carried over into labor arbitration, as was done in the lower
courts in the American Mfg. Co. case.
Id. at 318.
7239 N.Y. 199, 146 N.E. 203 (1924), cited in Cutler-Hammer case, supra note
5, 74 N.E. 2d at 464 (Dissent).
s Id. at 202-03, 146 N.E. at 203-04.
9 Annot., 24 A.L.R. 2d 752, 756 (1952).10 Id. at 755.
11 See Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKy
MT. L. REv. 247, 261 (1958). For a more complete discussion of the natures
and purposes of commercial and labor arbitration, see Phillips, The Function
of Arbitration in the Settlement of Industrial Disputes, 33 COLUm. L. REV.
1366 (1933).
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The effect of this doctrine, followed in a number of cases, 12 has been
twofold. First, if in the court's estimation, there was no basis for the
claim, it could refuse to allow arbitration even though the alleged dispute
might fall within the literal language of the arbitration agreement.13
Secondly, in determining that there was no basis, the court has been
allowed to inquire into the merits of the particular claim. This amounted
to a direct encroachment on the function of the arbitrator, the person
chosen by the parties to deal with these matters.1 Although these effects
are the same in both commercial and labor arbitration, the natures of
the two institutions, as mentioned above, cause the effects to present a
more serious problem in regard to labor arbitration.
In Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co.,15 the Court realized
that by trying to find a "bona fide" dispute, it was often considering the
same facts that an arbitrator deals with when he renders a decision on
the merits of a grievance. But it maintained that its duty to determine
arbitrability could not be carried out unless it examined the facts. "The
alleged breach must be 'put in issue by facts, as distinguished from un-
supported charges.'"16 To explain away the obvious encroachment, it
created the "quantum of proof" theory:
In the arbitration hearing, the party seeking relief must fully
establish his claim that the opposing party has violated the con-
12 The Cutler-Hammer doctrine seems to be deeply entrenched in New Jersey
and New York law. See Textile Workers Union v. Firestone Plastics Division,
6 N.J. Super. 235, 70 A. 2d 880 (1950) ; Standard Oil Develop. Co. Emp. Union
v. Esso R. & E. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 106, 118 A. 2d 70 (1955); George F.
Driscoll Co. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 15 Misc. 2d 770, 182 N.Y.S. 2d
778 (1958) ; Hausner v. Hopewell Products, Inc., 10 A.D. 2d 876, 201 N.Y.S.
2d 252 (1960). But see Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract,
72 HARV. L. REV. 1268, 1291 (1959) where the author feels that its influence is
decaying and cites Bohlinger v. National Cash Register Co., 305 N.Y. 539, 114
N.E. 2d 31 (1953) and Kharas and Kroetz, Judicial Determination of the
Arbitrable Issue, 11 ARE. J. (n.s.) 135 (1956) as authority.
This doctrine has spread to other state jurisdictions on occasion. See Grey-
hound Corp. v. Div. 1384, Amalgamated Ass'n, 44 Wash. 2d 808, 271 P. 2d
689 (1954); Pari-Mutuel Emp. Guild v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 169 Cal. App.
2d 571, 337 P. 2d 575 (1959).
For the Cutler-Hammer doctrine as the basis of federal court decisions,
see Barrett v. Miller, 166 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. N.Y. 1958) ; United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F. 2d 624 (6th Cir. 1959); International Union,
Etc. v. Benton Harbor Mal. Ind., 242 F. 2d 536 (6th Cir. 1957) ; Goodal-San-
ford Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 233 F. 2d 104 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Local 205,
Etc. v. General Electric Co., 233 F. 2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Local 379, Etc. v.
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 120 F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1953) ; Davenport v. Proctor and
Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 F. 2d 511 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry
Gyroscope Co., 251 F. 2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957).
12 General Electric Co. v. United Electrical R. & M. Workers, 300 N.Y. 262, 90
N.E. 2d 181 (1949).
14 See Scoles, Review of Labor Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional Grounds,
17 U. CHi. L. Rzv. 616, 627 (1950) and Summers, Judicial Review of Labor
Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1952).
15251 F. 2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957).
Ha Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., supra note 12 at 137 citing Appli-
cation of Berger, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 528, 532 (1948). In the latter case the union
characterized the abandonment of a department as a prohibited layoff. The
[Vol. 44
RECENT DECISIONS
tract. Determination of arbitrability only requires that the mov-
ing party produce evidence which tends to establish his claim.' 7
But how much evidence is necessary to determine arbitrability and yet
not encroach upon the function of an arbitrator? In New Bedford De-
fense Prod. Div. v. Local 1113, Etc.'" the Court declined to follow the
Cutler-Hanmner doctrine or adopt the "quantum of proof" theory, and
cited the lower court's holding that ". . . issues do not lose their quality
of arbitrability because they can be correctly decided only one way.'19
The only requirement was that a possible, rather than a "bona fide" dis-
pute be presented. The Court also compared the jurisdiction of an ar-
bitrator with that of a court and said that since a court would not lose
jurisdiction of a case because its solution may be crystal-clear under
the law, neither should be an arbitrator. In the following year, in Local
1912, Int. Ass'n of Mach. v. United States Potash Co.,20 the Court felt
that a determination of arbitrability involved a "modicum" of contract
interpretation. The inquiry into the merits was not to find a "bona fide"
dispute, however, but only to determine whether the contract was sus-
ceptible to an interpretation to cover the asserted dispute.1
In the principal case, United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
the Court stated that §203(d) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 22 sanctioned the use of final adjustment methods agreed upon by
the parties. According to the Court, the use of these methods could only
be effective if they were given "full play." Expressly referring to the
Cutler-Hammer decision, the Court said:
A state decision that held to the contrary announced a prin-
ciple that could only have a crippling effect on grievance arbitra-
tion.2
3
The Court criticized the Cutler-Hammer case for being preoccupied with
ordinary contract law. It realized that "in the context of the plant or
industry the grievance may assume proportions of which judges are
ignorant." The agreement states that all disputes are to be arbitrated,
not only those the courts consider meritorious.
company gave the business reasons for the abandonment and the union offered
no proof to support its own contention. The Court held that "in the absence
of such proof the 'characterization cannot convert what the facts abundantly
establish to be a determination in good faith of a matter of business policy
into something else."
7 Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., supra note 15, at 137.
is 258 F. 2d 522 (1st Cir. 1958).
L9 Id. at 526.
20 270 F. 2d 496 (loth Cir. 1959).
21Id at 499. The Court stated that "it is not for us to resolve the contrariety or to
choose between the courts and the arbitrators. It is enough that the contrariety
raises a question as to the proper interpretation or application of the contract-
a function which belongs to the arbitrator. Without more, it is plain that the
grievance dispute does not lie wholly outside the provisions of the contract,
and arbitration is therefore enforceable."
2261 Stat. 154 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §173(d) (1958).
23 United Steelworkers v. American Mffg. Co., supra note 1, at 566-67.
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The Supreme Court, with the Cutler-Hammer doctrine in mind,
seems to agree that some rules originating in commercial arbitration
have no place in labor arbitration.24 In accord with the New Bedford and
the United States Potash Co. cases, the Court declared the function of
the court to be "confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking ar-
bitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the con-
tract."
In the second of the three companion cases, petitioner union at-
tempted to compel arbitration under an agreement that if differences or
local trouble of any kind arose as to meaning and interpretation of the
contract, the grievance program, including arbitration, was to be used.
The agreement also contained a clause stating that all matters "strictly
a function of management" were not to be subjects of arbitration. The
company contracted out maintenance work usually performed by the
union members. A number of these members filed a grievance that this
practice amounted to a partial lockout which was prohibited by the
agreement. The grievance was not settled. The company refused to ar-
bitrate on the grounds that the basis for the grievance, contracting out
work, was a reserved function of management and not an arbitrable
issue. The District Court found that the company had contracted out
work in the past and the union had unsuccessfully attempted to prevent
the continuation of it by means of a collective bargaining agreement. It
sustained the company's contention and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that since there was a
dispute as to the meaning and application of the agreement, there
was an arbitrable issue. In order that a function of management clause
be used to block arbitration, the specific function of management in con-
tention must have been expressly excluded from arbitration in the
agreement. United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960).
One of the issues involved in this case is the concept of management
functions. Many writers refer to "management rights" as the residue
of management's pre-existing functions which remains after the negoti-
ation of a collective bargaining agreement.2 5 The nature of a collective
contract is "to limit management in the exercise of its discretion and
its otherwise unfettered authority." 26 A "strictly a function of manage-
24 The Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) expressly states that "in the commercial case,
arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute
for industrial strife . . . [and] . . . arbitration of labor disputes has quite
different functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agree-
ment."
25 Although "management functions" vary in different industries, basically they
include the rights of hiring, firing, organizing and directing the working force,
and directing and operating the plant and production. For a more complete
list, see BEATLY, LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBITRATION MANUAL 85-88 (1960).2 6
1BEATLY, LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBITRATION MANUAL 86 (1960).
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ment" clause inserted in the agreement serves to fortify the continu-
ing validity of management functions.2 7
The traditional approach to determine whether a function of man-
agement is an arbitrable issue is the search of the agreement for an ex-
press provision in the contract that it would be arbitrable.2 Where there
is no such provision, the particular function of management cannot be
a subject of arbitration. The Court in Amalgamated Ass'n, Etc. v.
Greyhound Coro., held that:
What is within the terms of the contract is governed by it.
What is without the terms of the contract is unaffected by it. Both
the employer and employee have complete freedom of action in
this unaffected field. 29
This position is taken because to hold otherwise would result in sub-
mitting to arbitration what the parties did not voluntarily wish to sub-
mit. In addition, the union might be able to gain from arbitration what
they were unable to secure at the bargaining table.
In the Warrior and Gulf Co. case, the Supreme Court did not adopt
the traditional approach. It felt that management functions were ar-
bitrable unless the company expressly excluded them from arbitration
in the agreement, 30 and held that "apart from matters that the parties
specifically exclude, all of the questions on which the parties disagree
must therefore come within the scope of the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the collective agreement." 31 The reason for this position
is that where there is a general arbitration clause, "the management
clause cannot be utilized to sever contractual rights vested in other parts
of the contract. '32 The Court felt that since contracting out work was
not expressly excluded in the agreement, there would be a question as
to whether or not it would affect other rights in the agreement. Main-
taining that the partial lockout claim presented an arbitrable issue of
contract interpretation, the Court held that the arbitrator's function
would be usurped if a court was also allowed to determine whether
contracting out work amounted to a partial lockout. The court's function
should cease when it determined that a particular claim did or did not
present a possible issue for arbitration. In determining arbitrability, the
court must not weigh the merits, but must see if the arbitration clause
27 TELLER, MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 94 (1947).
25 See In re Celanese Corp. of America, 33 Lab. Arb. 925, 929-31 (1959) for a
list of cases which apply this principle. Note that the District Court's decision
in the Warrior and Gulf Co. case is one of the chief cases cited in support of
the position.
29231 F. 2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1956).
30 For excerpts from cases which advocate this position, see In re Celanese
Corp. of America, supra note 28, at 937.
31 United Steehvorkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960).
32 44 L.R.R.M. 2019, 2021 (1959).
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is susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute and
any doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
This holding was criticized in Md. Tele. Union v. Tele. Co. of Md.:
It is hard to believe that the Court means that positions taken
and abandoned during collective bargaining can never be con-
sidered by the courts in determining whether a party should be
required to arbitrate, especially where a demand is withdrawn
as the result of an agreement between the parties. Effective bar-
gaining, as well as good faith, requires that parties live up to
their agreements, and that neither party attempt to secure by
arbitration what it renounced during negotiations.33
But it must be remembered that the parties contracted to have the ar-
bitrator decide all disputes. Therefore, would it not be up to the
arbitrator to consider the various positions taken at the bargaining
table ?
The position that the Warrior and Gulf Co. case took, as opposed
to the traditional approach in considering management functions, pre-
sents the greater possibility that management will suffer if this policy
is carried through. Contracts that contain a detailed list of "reserved"
management functions will be less likely to be accepted by the union.
This could force the company to sign an agreement omitting them and
thus be subjected to the situation in the principal case. But the arbitra-
tor is not essentially pro-labor and contra-management. It is most prob-
able that an arbitrator would have found that the union had no valid
claim in the fact situation of the Warrior and Gulf Co. case. What the
Supreme Court tried to do was to carry out the intent expressed in the
written agreement that "all disputes are to be settled by arbitration."
While the preceding two cases were examples of pre-arbitration
problems, the last case of the companion decisions presents a post-
arbitration problem. Here the petitioner union attempted to enforce an
arbitration award which reinstated unjustly discharged employees and,
except for a ten-day suspension period, provided for back pay since
their dismissal. The reinstatement and payment of part of the back pay
were for a period after the termination date of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The company objected to that part of the award which
dealt with occurrences subsequent to the termination date of the con-
tract and refused to submit to the award. The District Court directed
the company to comply, but the Court of Appeals held that that part
of the award dealing with reinstatement and payment of back pay after
the termination date of the agreement could not be enforced. The Su-
preme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals because it
considered the proper approach in this area to be that courts refuse to
review the merits of an arbitration award. It said that the whole arbitra-
33 35 Lab. Arb. 82, 87 (1960).
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tion procedure would be undermined if the courts had the final say on
the-merits of an award, since the arbitrator's informed judgment is an
essential part of the procedure. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
The classic statement of the doctrine of the finality of an arbitrator's
award occurs in Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co.34 Even be-
fore the Enterprise Co. case the courts have recognized the doctrine's
validity, but oftentimes have not applied it in their decisions. Whether
it was "professional jealousy" or, as one author maintains, the arbi-
trators' assumption of the attitude of judicial demi-gods who disregard
established principles of law and substitute their own brand of justice,35
which prompted judicial review of awards, is not certain. The result of
this practice was the demise of the phrase inserted by the parties that
"the determinations of the arbitrator are final as to the law and the
fact." In regard to a present trend, one author points to an increasing
judicial interference, 36 while another maintains that there exists "a
growing trend toward a judicial self-limitation which recognizes that
there are bounds to the scope of judicial review of arbitration."3
The Enterprise Co. case was primarily concerned with giving the
arbitrator a free reign in order to further the arbitration process. It
attempted to aid the development of this branch of industrial self-gov-
ernment.m Opponents of this view contend that the preservation and
safeguard of basic legal principles, recognized in the community at
large, outweigh the merits of allowing the arbitration procedure to go
unhampered by the courts. They say that administrative agencies are
functioning quite well even though the courts have the power to review
their decisions. They conclude that judicial review of awards will not
impair arbitration, but will aid it by confirming heretofore hesitant
parties that the awards will be legally just.39
Preoccupied with the notion that the courts have no business weigh-
ing the merits of the claim, the Supreme Court seemed to do its utmost
to prevent a court from reviewing an award and vacating it. It would
allow vacation, however, if the arbitrator exceeded his authority, since
"his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement." 40 Where the arbitrator's opinion is
ambiguous, as the Court thought it was in this case, "a mere ambiguity
- 62 N.Y. 392, 399-400 (1875).
35 Herzog, Judicial Review of Arbitration Proceedings-A Present Need, 5 DE
PAUL L. REv. 14, 25 (1955).
3Id. at 17.
3 Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CoRNUL L. Q.
519, 534 (1960).
38 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960).
39 Herzog, supra note 35, at 29-31.40 Supra note 38, at 597.
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in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference
that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for
refusing to enforce this award."4 1 But, primarily, the Supreme Court
felt that the Court of Appeals merely differed with the construction of
the contract that the arbitrator gave. To allow a vacation on this ground
would permit courts to review the merits of every construction of the
contract, but this is anathema to the Supreme Court.
The Court's attempt to prevent a review of the merits by a court
seems to have resulted in ignoring the view taken by the Court of Ap-
peals and by Justice Whittaker in the dissenting opinion in the Enter-
prise Co. case. They maintained that there existed a question of exceed-
ing given authority rather than one of interpreting the contract dif-
ferently. The Court of Appeals cited several cases which contained es-
tablished law that "rights [under a collective bargaining agreement]
remain in force only for the life of the contract unless renewed by
subsequent contract or preserved by statute. 14 2 The arbitrator's author-
ity comes from the contract and since there was no contract governing
the time that part of the award covered, it seems that the arbitrator
could have been adjudged to have acted outside his given authority.
The Supreme Court seemed to feel that the best way to effectuate
the labor arbitration process was to prohibit courts from weighing the
merits of a grievance. It was this idea that permeated the decisions of
the above three cases and gave rise to their results. In the field of labor
arbitration, definite roles are now allocated to the courts and to the
arbitrators, roles which are to be played in the advancement of industrial
self-government.
ROGER E. WALSH
The Trustee's Status as a Hypothetical Lien Creditor Under
Section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act: Constance v. Harvey Over-
ruled-In Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit,' the bank-
rupt borrowed money from the respondent on November 4, 1957, giving
a chattel mortgage on his automobile as security. Under Michigan law,
such mortgages were void as against creditors of the mortgagor unless
recorded immediately. 2 Respondent's mortgage was not recorded until
four days later on November 8, 1957, but no creditor had extended
credit in the interim between the execution and the recordation of the
mortgage. However, after the mortgagor filed a voluntary petition in
41 Id. at 598.
42 Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F. 2d 327, 331
(4th Cir. 1959).
1 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
2 MICH. COMp. LAWS s.566.140 (1948) as amended by PUBLIc Acr No. 233-
(1957). In 1959, by PUBLIC Acr No. 110, a 10-day grace period is now allowed
for the recording of chattel mortgages.
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